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Whatever be the solution, it must come soon if the promised
changes in the penal services are to have any effect. The modest pro-
posals of this writer are that:
(1) sentencing be left in the hands of the courts. (This stems
from a district of administrative tribunals).
(2) superior courts lay down a sentencing policy related to the
penal institutions available.
(3) sentencing 'officers be required to acquaint themselves in
detail with the penal facilities available within their juris-
diction.
(4) instruction and advice be made available to all sentencing
officers as to the employment of such facilities in the im-
plementation of the sentencing policy.
J. D. MORTON *
ABUSE OF MONOPOLY REVISITED--''Now, every person of
common sense knows what is involved in patent actions and what
the expense of them is, and everybody knows that to be threatened
with a patent action is about as disagreeable a thing as can happen
to a man in his business, even if he be innocent of any infringement
of patent law."
For many years it has been well recognized that threat of an
action under a patent can be more damaging and ruinous even than
the action itself. There is no way of compelling the patentee to
bring his action; he is at liberty to wait until the end of the seventeen
year term for which his patent is granted before filing his statement of
claim, in the meanwhile dangling his patent, like the Sword of
Damocles, over the heads of his trade rivals. There are, of course,
other remedies2 available to a person whose business is hindered by
the existence of a patent but the real mischief, is not the existence
of the patent but the threats posed by the owner of it to the trade
at large. For this reason, the British Patent Act3 provides a right
of action for an injunction and damages to any person aggrieved by
threats of a patent proceedings. There is no such provision in the
Canadian Patent Act4 and it remains to mention what other remedies
are available to a party injured by such threats.
In 1945, Dr. Harold G. Fox reviewed5 this situation, concluding
that there were three possible grounds on which to proceed: first,
under sec. 11(1) (a) and (c) of the Unfair Competition Act, 1932;6
* Professor Morton, M.A., LL.B. (Trinity College, Dublin), The King's Inns,
Dublin, and of Osgoode Hall, Barrister-at-law is a full-time member of the
Teaching Staff at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Sk nner v. Shew & Co., [18931, Ch. 413 at p. 424 per Bowen L.J.
2 An action for impeachment of patents, an action for a declaration of
non-infringements, and an application to grant a compulsory license.
3 Patent Act, 1949, 12, 13 and 14, Geo. VI, c. 87, s. 65.
4 Patent Act R.S.C., 1935, c. 203, as amended by 1953-54, 2-3 Eliz. II, c. 19.
and c. 40, s. 15.
5 Fox, Abuse of Monopoly (1945), 23 Can. Bar Rev. 353.
6 Unfar Competition Act, R.S.C., 1932, c. 38, s. 7(a).
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secondly, at common law under the heading of slander of title, and,
thirdly, under section 4 -of the Statute of Monopolies, 1624.7 The
common law action, however, requires proof that the threat was false,
proof of malice, and proof of special damage. In addition to this
heavy burden of proof, no decision was possible by the Exchequer
Court of Canada prior to 1928 because its special constitution denied
to it. any general jurisdiction at common law. Section 11 of the
Unfair Competition Act was entirely new in 1932 and, although
malice was not mentioned in the section, no-one seems to have
attempted to invoke it in the face of a threat of patent proceedings.
Indeed, the only reported case in which Section 11(1) (a) has ever
been invoked is that of Lebel v. Ontario Beauty Supply Co. Ltd.8
The only attempt made to apply section 4 of the Statute of Mono-
polies, which again does not require proof of malice, was in the
English case of Peck v. Hindes9 in 1898 in which Mathew J. merely
held that the statute did not apply to an unsuccessful action for
patent infringment. Perhaps because of these doubts and difficulties
no-one seems to have had the courage to make a serious attempt to
restrain threats of patent proceedings in Canada, at least since 1925;10
and, even then, it was not decided whether such an action lay at all.
The case of Reliable Plastics Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co. of
Canada Ltd." is, therefore, something of a landmark in Canadian
jurisprudence, being precisely such a case. The facts were simple;
the plaintiff and defendants both manufactured and competitively
sold basically similar plastic toy games, including miniature bagatelle
games. In 1953 a Canadian patent was issued to the first defendant
under which the second defendant was the sole licensee, and both
defendants were of the opinion that the plaintiff's games infringed
this patent. They first wrote to the plaintiff; and then later circu-
lated the trade (some 125 firms, including many of the plaintiff's
customers to the effect that the plaintiffs' games infringed the patent
and "to formally notify you of the patent in the thought that you
would not want to knowingly become an infringer thereof". The
plaintiff then instituted this action to restrain threats basing it on
all three of Dr. Fox's suggested grounds, and seeking an injunction
and damages. The defendants counterclaimed for infringement of
the patent and thereafter the action proceeded as a normal patent
action with the parties reversed.
The President of the Exchequer Court found that the patent was
valid and had been infringed, but he held that the plaintiff was
excused from liability for infringement by virtue of section 56 (now
58) of the Patent Act, which excludes infringing articles manufac-
tured or acquired before the issue of the patent. It is interesting
7 Statute of Monopolies, 1624 21 Jac. I c. 3, s. 4; R.S.O. 1897, c. 323, s. 4.8 Lebel v. Ontario Beauty Supply Co. Ltd. (1950), 12 Fox Pat. C. 175.
9 Peet v. Hinder (1898), 15 R.P.C. 113.
10 KiZgour Davenport Co. Ltd. v. Heale (1925), 280 O.W.N. 361-an un-
satisfactory case in which no order was made as to the counterclaim.
11 Reliable Plastics Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co. Inc. (1958), 17 Fox Pat.,
C. 184.
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to note in passing that the above section does not provide that such
articles are not infringements but merely that no liability attaches
to them. It thus affords a good example of a statute creating an
inchoate tort. The President's finding of validity and of infringe-
ment is not of general interest for present purposes, though the
finding is regrettable at least to the lawyer because it followed in his
judgment that the threats were not made maliciously in the sense
required by the common law. He dismissed the action under the
Statute of Monopolies on the basis of lack of evidence, and thereby
denied to the profession a discussion by one of our most eminent
judges of whether an Imperial Act of the reign of James 1st is still
in force ex 7proprio vigore in Canada.
The action under the Unfair Competition Act posed more of a
problem in that the President previously had held that the plaintiff
was not liable for the infringements because they had been manu-
factured before the issue of the patent. In his judgment, he said
that "even if it could be argued that the statement in the letter was
untrue-because of the freedom from liability afforded by Section 56,
that does not make it a false statement". 2 Lawyers may be thankful
that the distinction between "untrue" and "false" was not the ratio
decidendi of the case since no indication was given as to what would
be a false statement within the meaning of the section. However,
this passage in itself does seem to give some indication that there
must be an element of intention (mala fides) to render a statement
false. Further weight was lent to this attitude when he said later
that "the fact that the defendants failed to consider that the plaintiff
might escape liability under Section 56 is not sufficient to saddle it
with either falsity or malice".13 It is clear from this passage that,
although the words falsity and malice were used separately, both had
a subjective content of intention on the part of the defendants.
It is submitted that to place such a construction on the word
"false" would be a misuse of language, and that in any case it was
an unnecessary inclusion in an otherwise closely reasoned judgment.
It was unnecessary because the President had already held that the
articles in question were infringements and that, therefore, the letter
was, technically speaking, true. As a matter of language, the dic-
tionaries seem to indicate that "false" means untrue and "untrue"
means false; indeed it seems that to find "false" being used with a
subjective content one must turn to the poets rather than to the
statute book. But the writer's fundamental complaint is that to
suggest that "false" means something more than untrue would be
virtually to remove any teeth the section may ever have had. The
common law failed to provide an adequate remedy for threats of
patent proceedings because of its requirement of proof of malice and
because the construction put upon this word excludes recklessness
and carelessness in this context. To hold that an untrue statement
would not automatically be a "false" statement within the section
12 Ibid., at p. 203.
13 bId., at p. 204.
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would be virtually to let in the doctrine of common law malice by
the back door, with its well-known sterilizing effects.
As stated, this was not the substantial ground of the decision,
and it is worth observing that it is in conflict with Lebel v. Ontario
Beauty Supply Ltd. the only other case based on the section. In this
case Tindal C.J. found himself "convinced" that there was no malice
on the part of the maker of the statement complained of. On the
other hand, he found that the statement was not "in accordance with
the facts" and "therefore may be considered a false statement within
the meaning of the Act".14 It is submitted that this is the correct
construction to place on the word "false" in this context, and it is
to be hoped that Tindal C.J.'s opinion will be preferred in the future.
It should be noted that the relevant sub-section of the Unfair Compe-
tition Act is now embodied in Section 7 of the Trade Marks Act 1952,
and that the wording has been altered to "false or misleading state-
ment".15 The writer does not believe, however, that the addition of
the word "misleading" in any way alters the meaning of the word
"false". It is probable that the word "misleading" is intended to
include statements which while not technically false have the effect
of conveying a false impression or innuendo discrediting the wares
of a competitor, for example, "X's goods are cheaper than ours",
might suggest to many people that X's goods are inferior and if this
is not the case X might well have a remedy under the section.
In making this criticism of what is after all only an obiter
dictum, one must pursue to their conclusion the consequences of
regarding any untrue statement as "false" within the Act. Thus a
statement that an article infringes a patent can only be shown to be
true or false (untrue) by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
as to (a) infringement, and (b) validity of the patent. This is of
course because these questions are questions of law and not of fact,
and they are not capable of affirmative proof either way. This is
obvious, but it is equally obvious that It is practically impossible to
write an effective solicitor's "letter before action" in a patent case
without stating that the patent is infringed (and therefore valid by
implication). The patentee is in a dilemma. Should he boldly assert
that his patent can withstand any attack made upon it, and that it
is infringed, and run the risk -that either of these assertions may
later be held to be untrue? Or should he confine himself to the
facts, merely stating that he is the owner of patent number X? This
at best is a somewhat half-hearted letter to write to a trade com-
petitor. The latter course has been adopted in Britain, where it is
expressly provided that a letter in these terms shall not constitute
a threat.16 The former course has usually been adopted in Canada
in the past. While perhaps the Reliable Plastics case may have a
restraining effect on the senders of the majority of these threatening
letters, it is to be hoped that at some time in the not too disant future
14 Ibid., at p. 177.
35 Trade Marks and Unfair Competition Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 49, s. 7.
16 Patents Act. ante footnote 3. s. 65(2).
[VOL. I
a decision may be handed down giving real effect to Section 7(1) (a)
of the Trade Marks Act, which will clearly establish the right to stop
a patentee making wild threats of patent litigation. If a future
decision construes the section in the manner indicated by the writer,
it will then be appropriate to consider whether complete prohibition
is desirable or whether threats are permissible if made only to the
originator of the infringements, and not to the trade outlets, and
whether some limitation period is to be set in which the patentee
must bring his action, failing which the alleged infringer may force
the issue into the courts by way of an action to restrain threats.
GEORGE A. ROLSTON
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